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(RE) INTRODUCTION 
In the first portion of this Essay, I reviewed Professor Martin Redish‘s 
theory that the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in modern 
class action practice is unconstitutional.1  Professor Redish argues that 
modern class action procedures violate absent class members‘ due process 
rights by sweeping large numbers of individual plaintiffs into litigation 
without their explicit consent.  I then set forth Professor Redish‘s proposals 
for reform, including increased scrutiny of class actions to weed out ―faux‖ 
class actions that benefit lawyers but not class members, abandonment of 
the opt-out procedure under Rule 23 in favor of an opt-in procedure that 
would require absent class members to take some affirmative action before 
being swept into a class action, and prohibition of settlement classes, which 
Professor Redish believes are often subject to abuse.  The second portion of 
this Essay explores further implications and applications of Professor Re-
dish‘s theories. 
I. POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PROFESSOR REDISH‘S 
ANALYSIS 
The reforms Professor Redish proposes would not only further protect 
the due process and other constitutional rights that he identifies, but also 
would likely have a beneficial effect on modern class action practice from a 
policy standpoint.  The ―misuses‖ of Rule 23 he identifies that tend to lead 
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practical consequences that other commentators have identified.  Nonethe-
less, there may be ways in which Professor Redish‘s analysis could be ex-
tended even further.  Already, there are various aspects of class action 
practice that may serve to limit the use and abuse of the class action device.  
Importing the concepts of due process Professor Redish identifies into these 
areas may further bolster the effectiveness of class action procedures.  Al-
though the proposals discussed below—such as consideration of due 
process concerns as a factor in the certification decision, early resolution of 
the class certification question, liberal appellate review, and more extensive 
use of notice procedures—are less sweeping than the reforms Professor Re-
dish proposes, they may be more feasible.  Moreover, the concerns Profes-
sor Redish identifies may, to some extent, explain the limitations courts 
already impose in restricting application of the class action device.  While 
such concerns may not always be explicit, they may be implicit, or may 
provide an additional unexplored ground for the limitations imposed to 
date. 
Certainly such a mode of analysis would not be unprecedented.  The 
Supreme Court has long recognized that statutes and rules should be con-
strued in a manner that avoids potential constitutional problems.2  Thus, for 
example, the Court has observed that ―where a statute is susceptible of two 
constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions 
arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to 
adopt the latter.‖3  This doctrine of constitutional avoidance does not apply 
solely where an asserted constitutional question indisputably has merit, but 
rather is intended to ―allow[] courts to avoid the decision of constitutional 
questions.‖4  Accordingly, the doctrine applies where one interpretation of a 
statute or rule ―engenders constitutional issues‖ while ―a reasonable alterna-
tive interpretation‖ avoids those constitutional questions.5  Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has often applied the avoidance canon in situations where it 
later rejected the alleged constitutional deficiency.6 
Nor are the specific constitutional concerns Professor Redish identifies 
entirely foreign to the federal courts in the context of Rule 23.  In this re-
gard, Professor Redish‘s contention that ―at no point has the Supreme 
Court, in either its due process or class action jurisprudence, . . . fully ac-
knowledged the existence of the litigant autonomy interest‖ may be some-
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v. Fibreboard Corp., the Supreme Court specifically noted the due process 
interest in individual autonomy in constraining the use of the Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) mandatory class action device.8  There, the Court observed that 
―the Rules Enabling Act and the general doctrine of constitutional avoid-
ance would jointly sound a warning of the serious constitutional concerns 
that come with any attempt to aggregate individual tort claims on a limited 
fund rationale.‖9  In doing so, it specifically noted the due process concerns 
inherent in binding absent class members: 
 
[M]andatory class actions aggregating damages claims im-
plicate the due process ―principle of general application in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a 
judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not des-
ignated as a party or to which he has not been made a party 
by service of process,‖ Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 
(1940), it being ―our ‗deep-rooted historic tradition that 
everyone should have his own day in court.‘‖10 
 
In addition, the Court observed that these concerns were further magni-
fied ―in settlement-only class actions‖ where ―the procedural protections 
built into the Rule to protect the rights of absent class members during liti-
gation are never invoked in an adversarial setting.‖11 
A similar recognition of the important constitutional concerns raised by 
the application of Rule 23 may be applied to other aspects of class action 
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procedure.  Such a mode of analysis would have the beneficial effect of 
constraining Rule 23 so that it more closely adheres to constitutional re-
quirements without necessitating formal amendment of the rule or some 
form of official congressional action.  Indeed, many of the recent decisions 
constraining the use of the class action device may be viewed as implicitly 
recognizing such concerns—perhaps not as constitutional dictates, but at a 
minimum, as prudential concerns that deserve consideration in applying the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A. The Applicable Standard for Class Certification: Rigorous Scrutiny 
Such an analysis may be incorporated as part of the standard applied in 
determining whether to certify a class.  Recognizing the potential practical 
pitfalls of a certification decision (if not the significant constitutional con-
cerns), the Supreme Court has made clear that courts should undertake a 
―rigorous analysis‖ under Rule 23 before a class action is certified.12  As 
part of this analysis, courts could easily incorporate an inquiry into the ef-
fects of class certification on absent class members‘ due process rights and 
whether application of the class action device in the particular case would 
implicate a change in substantive law. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Ortiz seemed to be inviting such an anal-
ysis in specifically interpreting Rule 23(b)(1)(B) with an eye toward its 
broader constitutional implications.13  The Court cautioned against the ―ad-
venturous‖ use of the class action device for precisely this reason, specifi-
cally invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance as a canon of 
construction applicable to Rule 23.14  While Ortiz addressed the mandatory 
class action, there was no language in the opinion limiting its analysis to a 
particular category of class action case, and indeed its analysis would seem 
to be one of general applicability. 
B. Early Resolution of Class Certification Questions 
The constitutional concerns that Professor Redish raises could also be 
considered in determining the appropriate timing of the class certification 
decision.  The fundamental nature of the rights involved counsel in favor of 
an early resolution of the class certification question.  Already, Rule 
23(c)(1)(A) directs that a decision on class certification should occur ―[a]t 
an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class representa-
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stances, these rules require that a motion seeking class certification be filed 
within a specified number of days after a class action complaint.16 
The constitutional concerns that Professor Redish identifies further 
support early determination of class certification.  To the extent a lawsuit 
threatens to drag in parties who did not file the litigation, a determination 
that impacts such parties‘ due process rights to avoid inclusion in the litiga-
tion should be resolved early in the proceedings.  Such principles may be 
invoked to prevent attempts to draw out or postpone the class certification 
decision.  Likewise, they may support a party‘s efforts to have class certifi-
cation decided early in the proceedings without discovery, via a motion to 
strike or dismiss the class allegations.17  Again, Rule 23(d)(1)(D) specifical-
ly authorizes such procedures by directing that courts may ―require that the 
pleadings be amended to eliminate allegations about representation of ab-
sent persons.‖18  Courts also have an independent obligation to determine 
whether a class is properly certified and may do so sua sponte.19   
C. Immediate Appellate Review 
Constitutional concerns may also play a role in determining the timing 
of appellate review of a class certification decision.  Under Rule 23(f), a 
federal appellate court has discretion to accept an immediate appeal of a de-
cision on class certification.20  However, even before this provision was 
enacted, courts had accepted interlocutory appeals of class certification de-
cisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or reviewed such decisions by way of a 
writ of mandamus, recognizing that such decisions could have significant 





Local Rule 23.1(c) of the Northern District of Ohio is representative: 
[T]he party or parties asserting a class action shall, within ninety (90) days after the filing of a plead-
ing asserting the existence of a class or within such other period of time mandated by controlling statute, 
move for a determination under Fed R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1), whether the action is to be maintained and, if 
so, the membership of the class. 
N.D. Ohio Local Rule 23.1(c) (link).  See also McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 1411 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (―Indeed, this court has noted that Local Rule 1-13(b) ‗implements the policy‘ behind the al-
ready extant requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) that class certification decisions be made ‗as soon 
as practicable.‘‖ (citation omitted)) (link). 
17  
See, e.g., Barabin v. Aramark Corp., 210 F.R.D. 152, 162 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (rejecting class allega-
tions on face of complaint); Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc., 703 F.2d 1197, 1210 (10th Cir. 1983) 
(upholding trial court decision striking and dismissing class claims); Thornton v. State Farm Mut. Auto 
Ins. Co., No. 1:06-cv-00018, 2006 WL 3359482, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2006) (granting defendant‘s 
motion to strike class allegations and rejecting plaintiffs‘ request for further discovery). 
18  
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(D) (link).  Such motions might also be brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(f) or 12(b)(6) (link).   
19  
See McGowan v. Faulkner Concrete Pipe Co., 659 F.2d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 1981). 
20  
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (link).  See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, § 21.28, at 282 (4th 
ed. 2004) (―Whether to grant an interlocutory appeal lies within the discretion of the court of appeals.‖) 
(link). 
21  
See In re. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
―[m]andamus has occasionally been granted to undo class certifications,‖ citing In re Fibreboard Corp., 
104:330 (2010) Wholesale Justice II 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/10/ 335 
orders by dispensing with the requirement that the district court certify the 
order for interlocutory review under § 1292(b) or that the party seeking re-
view meet the more stringent requirements necessary to obtain a writ of 
mandamus. 
Among the factors that appellate courts consider in determining wheth-
er to grant interlocutory appeal of a certification decision are (1) whether 
the order presents the ―death knell‖ of litigation for plaintiffs or defendants; 
(2) whether it shows a ―substantial weakness, amounting to an abuse of dis-
cretion‖; and (3) whether interlocutory appeal is necessary to ―resolve an 
unsettled legal issue that is central to the case and intrinsically important to 
other cases but is otherwise likely to escape review‖ absent an immediate 
appeal.22  However, this analysis could well incorporate the danger that cer-
tification poses to fundamental rights.  Does the certification decision 
threaten to undermine the due process rights of absent class members or ef-
fect an improper change in substantive law?  If so, immediate review is ar-
guably warranted to avert such constitutional violations. 
D. The Right to Object 
Finally, the ability of individuals to object to class certification where 
the defendants and the named plaintiffs have jointly sought such a result 
provides an important safeguard and potential guarantor of constitutional 
rights.23  As Professor Redish himself acknowledges, it is unlikely that set-
tlement classes will be completely abolished.  Nonetheless, objectors may 
make many of the arguments Professor Redish outlines in opposition to cer-
tification of particular classes.  They may argue, for example, that class 
members do not stand to benefit, while the lawyers may receive significant 
fees or that a class settlement should be disallowed.24  Indeed, the objectors 
in Ortiz raised many of the same constitutional concerns Professor Redish 
identifies.  While the Court did not articulate a per se rule against settle-
ment classes or mandatory class actions, it did take such concerns into ac-
count in holding that class certification was inappropriate under the 
particular circumstances before it and cautioning that the class action device 
should not be used in an ―adventurous‖ manner.25 
                                                                                                                           
893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990)) (link); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (review-
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One might argue that the objector mechanism functions imperfectly 
where the value of each individual claim is small and there is little incentive 
for absent class members to object.  However, objectors may be entitled to 
receive attorney fees, which could increase the likelihood of objections.26  
Moreover, there may be ways to bolster the objector mechanism as a means 
of safeguarding constitutional rights.  Where no objectors come forward, 
the court could appoint a neutral representative to analyze whether class 
treatment is appropriate.27  Likewise, public interest litigators may file ob-
jections to certification in cases where they believe that constitutional rights 
are in danger.28  In any event, the possibility of objection to proposed class 
certification decisions represents a potential mechanism by which the con-
stitutional concerns Professor Redish raises may be vindicatedat least to 
some extent. 
E. More Liberal Use of Notice Procedures 
Another potential way in which these constitutional concerns may 
come into play is in the consideration of what types of notice must be given 
to absent class members.  Under Rule 23, notice is required under certain 
specified circumstances, including to inform absent class members that they 
have the ability to opt-out of a Rule 23(b)(3) class or that the court has been 
asked to approve a class settlement.29  Even beyond the required notice pro-
visions, however, the rules authorize federal courts to require the parties to 
provide absent class members notice in other circumstances.  Thus, for ex-
ample, Rule 23(d)(1)(B) authorizes the court to require notice ―to protect 
class members and fairly conduct . . . any step in the action; the proposed 
extent of the judgment; or the members‘ opportunity to signify whether they 
consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present 
claims or defenses, or to otherwise to come into the action.‖30 
In determining whether additional notice is appropriate, courts could 





See MANUAL, supra note 20, § 21.643, at 326 (―An objector who wins changes in the settlement 
that benefit the class may be entitled to attorney fees, either under a fee-shifting statute or under the 
‗common-fund‘ theory.‖) (link). 
27  
See id. § 21.644, at 329 (discussing the role of magistrate judges, special masters, and other judi-
cial adjuncts) (link).  
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See Center for Class Action Fairness, http://centerforclassactionfairness.blogspot.com/ (last vi-
sited Mar. 25, 2010) (discussing the work of the Center for Class Action Fairness, a public interest law 
firm that files objections to class action settlements) (link). 
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See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2), (d), (e)(1), (h)(1) (link). 
30  
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(B) (link). 
31  
As the Manual for Complex Litigation observes, there are also prudential reasons for requiring 
expansive notice.  Notice ―provides the structural assurance of fairness that permits representative par-
ties to bind absent class members . . . [as well as] an opportunity for class members to participate in the 
litigation, to monitor the performance of class representatives and class counsel, and to ensure that the 
predictions of adequate representation made at the time of certification are fulfilled.‖  MANUAL, supra 
note 22, § 21.31, at 285 (link). 
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parties to communicate information to absent class members, such as the li-
kelihood that they will actually receive compensation through a class action 
lawsuit or the steps being taken in the litigation.  Likewise, they may re-
quire that class members be notified of their right and ability to actively 
participate in their own defense or object to the conduct of the action.  
While this additional notice is not without cost, technological innovations 
have helped reduce such expenses.32 
F. Limitations of the Class Action Device in Certain Contexts Such as 
Mass Torts 
There are other areas in which the class action device has been ex-
pressly limited and in which such constitutional concerns may be either im-
plied or, at a minimum, may provide an alternative rationale for an existing 
judicial trend.  For example, after the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Am-
chem and Ortiz it has become exceedingly difficult to certify a class in the 
context of a mass tort.33  Indeed, even before these decisions, courts had 
recognized that there was a ―national trend to deny class certification in 
drug or medical product liability/personal injury cases.‖34  This resistance to 
certification in such cases can be traced to the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, 
which specifically noted that the class action device was ―ordinarily not ap-
propriate‖ in a ―mass accident‖ case where there would be ―significant 
questions . . . affecting the individuals in different ways.‖35   
On their face, these decisions are based on the Rule 23 requirements.36  





See A.L.I., supra note 7, § 1.05 cmt. i, at 57 (―Technological advances have made it easier and 
less expensive for lawyers to communicate with clients and class members.  Many lawyers now regard 
communicating by e-mail and via websites as standard practice techniques.‖). 
33  
See MANUAL, supra note 22, § 22.7, at 413–14 (―After experimentation with class treatment of 
some mass torts during the 1980s and 1990s, the courts have greatly restricted its use in mass torts litiga-
tion.‖) (link); RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 72 (2007) (―As em-
bodied in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966, the modern class action seemed on its 
face a device with little applicability to mass torts.‖) (link).   
The American Law Institute‘s draft Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation summarizes the 
state of the law: ―As a doctrinal matter, the class action has fallen into disfavor as a means of resolving 
mass-tort claims.  This development reflects many factors, including concerns about the quality of the 
representation received by members of settlement classes, difficulties presented by choice-of-law prob-
lems, and the need for individual evidence of exposure, injury, and damages.‖ (citation omitted).  A.L.I., 
supra note 7, § 1.02, notes to cmt. b(1)(B), at 26. 
34  
In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1089 (6th Cir. 1996) (link).  
35  
FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1966 Amend (link).  See also In re 
―Agent Orange‖ Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 164 (2d Cir. 1987) (―The comment to Rule 23(b)(3) 
explicitly cautions against use of the class action device in mass tort cases.  Moreover, most courts have 
denied certification in those circumstances.‖ (citation omitted)) (link). 
36  
See, e.g., In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 248 F.R.D. 389, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (recognizing 
that ―[l]ower courts almost unanimously have rejected class certification in pharmaceutical products lia-
bility actions . . . because the proposed class actions failed to satisfy many of Rule 23‘s requirements‖); 
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claims in such cases that generally make class certification inappropriate.37  
Such individual differences make it impossible to demonstrate the typicality 
or adequacy necessary for certification under Rule 23(a).  Likewise, they 
make it difficult to demonstrate that a class has the requisite ―cohesiveness‖ 
for certification under Rule 23(b)(2) or that common issues ―predominate‖ 
as required under Rule 23(b).38 
Nonetheless, the more fundamental constitutional principles Professor 
Redish articulates may provide an alternative ground for such decisions.  
While under a literal interpretation of Rule 23 the type of case should be ir-
relevant for purposes of the constitutional analysis, as a practical matter, the 
autonomy concerns in a case involving personal injuries may be even more 
acute.39  In mass tort cases, absent class members may have a particularly 
acute interest in personally determining whether to file litigation in the first 
instance and the course the litigation takes.  This autonomy interest may be 
demonstrated in the fierce opposition generated by the nationwide asbestos 
settlement classes proposed in Amchem and Ortiz.40  There, the concerns of 
individual litigants were so great that they pursued their objections all the 
way to the Supreme Court on multiple occasions.  While the need for alter-
native grounds for objecting to certification under such circumstances may 
                                                                                                                           
that product liability cases typically present issues of liability and damages that are highly individual and 
therefore rarely qualify under the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)‖ (citation omitted)). 
37  
See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997) (quoting the lower court‘s 
observation that ―[c]lass members were exposed to different asbestos-containing products, for different 
amounts of time, in different ways, and over different periods,‖ that ―[s]ome class members suffer no 
physical injury or have only asymptomatic pleural changes, while other suffer from lung cancer, disabl-
ing asbestosis, or from mesothelioma,‖ and that ―[d]ifferences in state law . . . compound these dispari-
ties‖) (link); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d at 1081 (denying class certification because ―[p]roofs as 
to strict liability, negligence, failure to warn, breach of express and implied warranties will . . . vary 
from plaintiff to plaintiff‖) (link). 
38  
See, e.g., Blain v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 240 F.R.D. 179, 190 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (―Predomin-
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Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 461 (E.D. La. 2006) (―[C]ourts have almost invariably found that 
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Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61, 74–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying certification of Rule 
23(b)(2) class that was not sufficiently ―cohesive‖); see also Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 
142–43 (3d Cir. 1998) (observing that ―[w]hile 23(b)(2) class actions have no predominance or superior-
ity requirements, it is well established that the class claims must be cohesive‖ and that ―a (b)(2) class 
may require more cohesiveness than a (b)(3) class‖) (link). 
39  
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633 (3d Cir. 1996) (observing in asbestos context that ―[e]ach plaintiff has a significant interest in indi-
vidually controlling the prosecution of separate actions‖ and that ―[p]laintiffs have a substantial stake in 
making individual decisions on whether and when to settle‖) (link); Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 
F.R.D. 566, 572 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (finding that ―members of the purported class have a vital interest in 
controlling their own litigation because it involves serious personal injuries and death in some cases,‖ 
citing Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970)); see also NAGAREDA, supra note 
32, at 233 (noting the ―commitment to individual autonomy‖ that is ―a central feature of the present, liti-
gation-based view of mass torts‖) (link). 
40  
See Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 607 (1997) (observing that ―[s]trenuous objections had been 
asserted regarding the adequacy of representation‖) (link). 
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not be great, the intensity of the individual autonomy interest may be an al-
ternative explanation for fierce opposition to these settlements and the 
courts‘ rulings rejecting them. 
G. Limitations on Nationwide Class Actions 
Another area in which implicit constitutional concerns may have some 
explanatory power is in the courts‘ treatment of purported nationwide class 
actions.  Again, the difficulty in obtaining certification of such classes has 
been significant, and, again, such difficulty implicitly may be due in part to 
the extent to which they threaten fundamental constitutional interests.41  As 
in the case of mass tort class actions, the courts have focused on individual 
differences among the claims of absent class members in denying certifica-
tion of nationwide classes.  In the context of a nationwide class action 
where different states‘ laws may apply to individual claims, the problem re-
garding the unique nature of each claim becomes even more significant.  As 
one federal court has observed, ―[n]o class action is proper unless all liti-
gants are governed by the same legal rules.‖42  In a nationwide class action, 
however, this is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. 
Once again, the constitutional concerns Professor Redish raises may 
provide an alternative explanation or potential alternative ground for reach-
ing the same result.  While in theory it should not matter whether the due 
process rights of one or one thousand individuals are implicated when as-
sessing the constitutionality of class actions, in practice the constitutional 
concerns regarding abridgement of individual autonomy become much 
greater as the size of the class expands and individual differences among the 
claimants proliferate.  Under such circumstances, named class representa-
tives cannot possibly be said to ―represent‖ the interests of absent class 
members or serve as a safeguard in the face of a potential denial of funda-
mental constitutional rights.  Accordingly, the tendency of courts to deny 
class certification in the context of a nationwide class action may be explic-
able in part by the potential threat such actions pose to fundamental consti-
tutional rights.  At a minimum, such concerns provide an additional basis to 
question the application—or narrowly construe the application—of Rule 23 





See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 742 n.15 (5th Cir. 1996) (observing that it is 
―difficult to fathom how common issues could predominate‖ in a nationwide class ―when variations in 
state law are thoroughly considered‖) (link); In re American Med. Sys., Inc.,  75 F.3d at 1085 (―If more 
than a few of the laws of the fifty states differ, the district judge would face an impossible task of in-
structing a jury on the relevant law, yet another reason why class certification would not be the appro-
priate course of action.‖ (citation omitted)) (link); James E. Pfander, The Tidewater Problem: Article III 
and Constitutional Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1925, 1975 (2004) (―In the class action context . . 
. diversity preserves the conflicting bodies of state law that make the certification of nationwide class 
actions virtually impossible today in federal court.‖). 
42  
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(link). 
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H. Scrutiny of Class Definition 
Finally, the due process concerns Professor Redish raises may poten-
tially explain the emphasis many courts have given to the issue of class de-
finition.  Typically, a proposed class cannot be certified unless it is 
adequately defined and clearly ascertainable under objective criteria.43  
Courts have observed that an adequate class definition is ―crucial‖ because 
―the outcome of a class action suit is res judicata as to all unnamed class 
members.‖44  Where a plaintiff fails to present a workable class definition, 
the class allegations are properly stricken or dismissed as a matter of law.45   
The requirement of an objectively defined class that makes determina-
tion of class membership feasible is often raised in precisely the sorts of 
cases that present acute due process concerns.  Thus, for example, 
―[s]everal decisions denying class certification in pharmaceutical products 
liability and medical monitoring cases have found that class membership is 
not feasibly ascertainable where it hinges on myriad medical factors indi-
vidual to each class member.‖46   
It is precisely this sort of case in which the constitutional concerns Pro-
fessor Redish raises may be particularly significant, given that where it is 
impossible to define who exactly will be bound by a class determination, 
there are obvious concerns regarding due process.  Absent class members 
will not be able to determine whether they must assert their right to opt out 
of a proposed class where the class definition is vague.  Accordingly, they 
may be held to have effectively waived any due process right not only 
merely through inaction, but where their objection to inclusion is rendered 





 See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 1977) (reviewing the re-
quirements for class certification) (link); Clay v. Am. Tobacco Co., 188 F.R.D. 483, 490 (S.D. Ill. 1999) 
(rejecting class definition that included ―all persons in the United States who, as children, purchased and 
smoked cigarettes‖ sold by defendants, noting that ―[t]he actual number of potential class members is 
enormous and, more importantly, amorphous‖ and that ―[a]t no time during this case would the exact 
membership of this class be ascertainable‖); MANUAL, supra note 22, § 21.222, at 270 (―Defining the 
class is of critical importance because it identifies the persons (1) entitled to relief, (2) bound by a final 
judgment, and (3) entitled under Rule 23(c)(2) to the ‗best notice practicable‘ in a Rule 23(b)(3) ac-
tion.‖) (link). 
44  
Alliance to End Repression, 565 F.2d at 977 n.6 (link). 
45  
See, e.g., Earnest v. Gen. Motors Corp., 923 F. Supp. 1469, 1473 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (holding that 
plaintiffs‘ failure to set forth an adequate class definition ―entitles a court to dismiss the class allegations 
and proceed with the action on an individual basis‖ (citation omitted)) (link). 
46  
In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 248 F.R.D. 389, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citation omitted); see al-
so Gevedon v. Purdue Pharma, 212 F.R.D. 333, 335–37 (E.D. Ky. 2002) (declining to certify class in 
products liability action based on plaintiff‘s failure to define identifiable class); In re Aredia & Zometa 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:06-MD-1760, 2007 WL 3012972, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2007) (rejecting 
―open-ended‖ class definition based on ―myriad individual differences within the proposed plaintiff 
class‖). 
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CONCLUSION 
Wholesale Justice is a signally important work, one that has important 
consequences for policymakers, the judiciary, practitioners, and indeed the 
public at large.  By articulating the important constitutional concerns inhe-
rent in the class action procedure as applied in current practice, Professor 
Redish provides a valuable basis for needed reforms.  His contribution de-
monstrates that such reforms are needed not merely to curtail abuses that 
have negative policy implications, but also to protect fundamental rights 
that to date have largely been ignored. 
